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  Good governance is a good idea.  We would all be better off, and citizens of many 
developing countries would be much better off, if public life were conducted within 
institutions that were fair, judicious, transparent, accountable, participatory, responsive, 
well-managed, and efficient.  For the millions of people throughout the world who live in 
conditions of public insecurity and instability, corruption, abuse of law, public service 
failure, poverty, and inequality, good governance is a mighty beacon of what ought to be. 
 
Due to this intuitive appeal, good governance has grown rapidly to become a 
major ingredient in analyses of what’s missing in countries struggling for economic and 
political development.  Researchers have adopted the concept as a way of exploring 
institutional failure and constraints on growth.  Putting governance right has become a 
major aspect of development assistance.  Advocates have linked the advancement of a 
variety of issues to improved governance.  By the 2000s, a significant portion of the 
development agenda was related to good governance; international development agencies 
created departments of governance, employed a small army of governance advisors and 
researchers, included governance components in their assistance packages, and increased 
funding for good governance initiatives.   
 
Intuitively and in research, good governance is a seductive idea—who, after all, 
can reasonably defend bad governance?  Nevertheless, the popularity of the idea has far 
outpaced its capacity to deliver.  In its brief life, it has also muddied the waters of 
thinking about the development process.  The trajectory of this idea—an introduction that 
provides new energy to research and practice, mounting popularity as it is adopted by a 
host of academics and practitioners, and inflation as it becomes increasingly essential to 
end goals in development—is not uncommon in the field of development.  Indeed, the 
field can be credited with much faddism of the magic bullet variety, overly susceptible to 
the thrall of ideas that promise to deal effectively with a host of constraints on prosperity 
and equity.  Community development, basic needs, participation, sustainability, 
appropriate technology, and a host of other ideas—the history of development thinking is 
littered with elastic concepts that grow in inclusiveness as they become popular.  None of 
them is necessarily a bad idea, and some are probably very good ideas, but all have fallen 
short of the inflated expectations of their proponents.   
 
Having failed to meet these expectations, or having unearthed knowledge of new 
constraints, such concepts have often been devalued as the field moved on to new ideas 
that promised to “deliver” development.  This is a possible future for the concept of good 
governance.  But throwing away ideas that fall short of expectations is rarely warranted, 
and good governance is a useful concept.  It calls needed attention to the institutional underpinnings of effective economic and political management.  Yet this laudable idea 
has become conflated with the capacity to generate growth, alleviate poverty, and bring 
effective democracy to peoples in poor countries.  Rather than discarding it because it has 
become inflated, scholars and practitioners should instead seek a reasonable 
understanding of what good governance can deliver—and what it cannot.  They should 
also assume more realistic expectations about how much good governance can be 
expected in poor countries struggling with a plethora of demands on their capacities to 
pursue change.  In this chapter, I explore how and why the concept of good governance 
emerged and grew too large, and then suggest ways that academics and practitioners can 
become more sensitive to the limitations of fads and to curb the tendency toward idea 
inflation.
1   
 
Good Governance: The New Kid in Development Discourse 
   
Governance is widely understood, when used with regard to government or the 
public sector, to refer to the institutional underpinnings of public authority and decision 
making.  In this way, governance encompasses the institutions, systems, “rules of the 
game” and other factors that determine how political and economic interactions are 
structured and how decisions are made and resources allocated.
2  Clearly implicit in the 
general concept is the notion that good governance is a positive feature of political 
systems and that bad governance is a problem that countries need to overcome.   
 
Good governance most generally refers to a list of admirable characteristics of 
how government ought to be carried out—“Sweden or Denmark on a good day, perhaps,” 
as Matt Andrews has written.
3  Indeed, much of the concept’s popularity can be linked to 
the positive images it embodies.  For the World Bank, for example, attractive 
characteristics of good governance are accountability and transparency, efficiency in how 
the public sector works, rule of law, and ordered interactions in politics.
4  The UNDP, 
which has taken a strong interest in the promotion of good governance, singles out 
characteristics like participation, transparency, accountability, effectiveness, and equity 
as its most important characteristics.
5  Hyden, Court, and Mease refer to dimensions of 
good governance—participation, fairness, decency, efficiency, accountability, and 
transparency—that are equally evocative.
6   
 
Good governance at times is also used to refer to normative concerns about what 
government should do—reduce poverty, for example, or maintain macroeconomic 
stability, or provide basic services.  The UK’s Department for International Development, 
for example, a recognized leader in focusing attention on governance issues in the 
international donor community, identifies a series of “capabilities,” most of which are 
expectations about what governments should do—ensure voice, macroeconomic stability, 
growth that is poverty reducing, policies that positively affect the poor, universal 
provision of basic services, personal and national security, and accountable government.
7  
Elsewhere, “goods” such as property rights, education, and healthcare are included as 
indicators of good governance.  Kaufman includes both “how” and “what” features such 
as accountability, political stability, effectiveness; rule of law; and control of corruption.
8  
Thus, in the bundle of good things that have come to be understood as good governance, 
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particular kinds of policies. 
 
Despite some differences in the definition, the idea of good governance has also 
resonated across a wide political spectrum.  For those on the political right, good 
governance has meant order, rule of law, and the institutional conditions for free markets 
to flourish.  For those on the political left, good governance incorporates notions of 
equity and fairness, protection for the poor, for minorities, and for women, and a positive 
role for the state.  For many others found along the continuum from right to left, the 
concept is attractive for its concern about order, decency, justice, and accountability. 
 
The emergence and popularity of the idea of good governance can be credited to 
more than its attractive characteristics and admirable policy goals, however.  Indeed, by 
the late 1980s, a confluence of intellectual and experiential trends brought increased 
visibility to this idea.
9  Particularly in the fields of economics and political science, and 
echoed in practitioner and advocacy communities, the concept was a useful way to re-
acknowledge the important role of the state in development.  It took on greater life as a 
solution to a practical dilemma faced by development practitioners—how to frame 
political interactions in a way that appeared to be apolitical.  It also grew in influence as 
the result of research practices that privileged large samples of countries over in-depth 
analysis of individual cases.  And it became even more popular when advocates of 
various causes found it a useful umbrella under which to present and justify their 
particular concerns.  The idea of good governance thus proved useful—and flourished 
from the late 1980s to the present.    
 
  Origins: Rehabilitating the State.  The idea of good governance owes much to 
the intellectual resurrection of the state as a positive “player” in economic and political 
development.  The state, of course, had long been at the center of development practice; 
from mercantilism in 16
th century Europe to import substitution in the mid-20
th century in 
late developing countries, the state was a center of investment decisions and policies to 
spur growth.  Similarly, academic literatures of the 1950s-1970s recognized the important 
role of states in the development process—economists argued that in poor countries, the 
state needed to provide investments that would stimulate economic development and 
political scientists found that centralized states were important for nation building and 
political modernization.   
 
Despite this long history, and also because of it, by the mid-1970s, academic 
researchers began to raise a series of questions about state-led growth and state-
dominated political societies.  Their concerns mirrored increased awareness of the 
potential for states to fail in their developmental responsibilities.  By the early-1980s, 
questioning the positive contributions of the state to development had turned into a 
profound critique of theory and practice and generated a watershed of anti-statist research 
and commentary in the development literature.
10  With increasing regularity, the virtues 
of free markets were found to be far superior to the vices of statism and highly 
centralized states were held to account for quashing local communities and the 
associational life that is essential to democracy and limited government.  Development 
  3practitioners, led by international development agencies, followed suit with advice and 
aid focused on reducing the role of the state in development and, somewhat later, in 
advocating for strengthened “civil society.” 
 
In practice and in theory, this strong anti-statist perspective was relatively short-
lived, even though skepticism about the state continued to characterize research and 
practice.  As the 1980s gave way to the 1990s, specialists in development economics 
became more interested in the role of institutions in the life of market economies as a 
result of both experience and theory-building initiatives.
11  In practice, the fall of the 
Soviet Union, followed by a very rapid transition to a market economy in Russia—
chaotically and with devastating consequences for the vast majority of the population—
underscored the role of institutions such as property rights, contract law, and regulatory 
rules for a properly functioning market.
12   
 
On the more academic front, Douglass North published his most widely-read 
work, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, in 1990.
13  This 
work, along with an increasing interest in the “new institutional economics,” focused new 
attention on the long term evolution of “rules of the game” and how they shape 
development trajectories.
14   Simultaneously, a lively literature on the East Asian “tigers” 
generated two important findings: the state had assumed an extremely important role in 
the emergence of some of them—underlining the positive role that states could play in 
development—and their vibrant economies did not rely on similar kinds of state action—
suggesting that countries could pursue distinct strategies with regard to the role of the 
state in their development.
15  Increasingly, researchers claimed that it was not the size of 
the state that mattered; more important was its quality, and quality was a function of state 
institutions and their credibility.
16   
 
Discussions of politics demonstrated the same intertwining of theory and practice.  
Transitions to democracy in the 1980s and early 1990s, particularly in Latin America and 
Eastern Europe, encouraged political scientists to pay more attention to the institutional 
infrastructure characterizing different kinds of regimes.
17  Similarly, efforts to explain 
lack of development in a number of African countries, along with increasing concern 
about autocratic and brutal governments, focused research attention on the role of 
institutions in political development.
18  At the same time, researchers found steady work 
in the analysis of constitutional structures, electoral and party systems, political 
corruption, and the management of the state.  At the level of theory, the notion of state 
autonomy and its limitations was the subject of considerable intellectual interest.  This 
trend took on an identity as a movement for “Bringing the State Back In.”
19   
 
Beginning in the mid-1980s and accelerating during the 1990s, then, academic 
literature and development discourse more generally flourished with discussions of the 
role of institutions in development and the positive contributions that states must make if 
market economies and democracies are to work effectively.  By 1991, the bell-weather 
World Development Report included a chapter on “Rethinking the State;” in 1997, the 
annual volume was sub-titled, The State in a Changing World.
20  This indicated in very 
important ways that the state, although often creating impediments to development, had 
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of the game” for economic and political life, its activities were central to the development 
process.  Not surprisingly, those states that managed these tasks well were credited with 
good governance.       
 
Popularity: Providing a Fig Leaf.  The popularity of the idea of good governance 
owes something to the fig leaf.  As interest in institutions and the role of the state 
increased throughout the decade of the 1990s, simultaneously, it was not long before 
multilateral and bilateral development agencies began actively discussing a characteristic 
emblematic of any notion of bad governance—corruption.  Stimulated in part by 
researchers at the World Bank, exploring the causes of corruption became a major focus 
of development economists.
21  Indeed, the World Bank declared that corruption is “the 
single greatest obstacle to economic and social development.”
22  Similarly, issues like 
accountability and transparency, which in many uses implied a relationship between the 
governors and the governed, emerged as potent weapons in the battle against corruption.  
As many countries installed more democratic regimes, the role of citizens, elections, and 
civic organizations in forcing governments to be good gained prominence.
23 
 
  This discussion was an opportunity for researchers to investigate new issues and 
constraints on development, to delve into a world of ambiguity and attempt to bring 
clarity to the actions and interactions of institutions, politicians, public officials, decision 
making, leadership, and resource allocation.  It called attention to the way citizens and 
states interacted.  The consequences of this new interest were evident across the social 
sciences.  For some economists, for example, the ways in which markets operated 
differently in different countries could be understood as artifacts of distinct institutions 
and the incentives they embodied.  In political science and history, market-like rational 
actor models of the decision making of politicians were questioned by those arguing for 
institutions and path dependence in the diverse historical trajectories of countries.
24  In 
economics and other fields, new institutionalism focused attention on the behavioral 
incentives embedded in different kinds of “rules of the game.”  The management sciences 
adopted the “new public management” that encouraged institutional engineering for more 
effective management of public affairs.
25  For students of African development, in 
particular, the issue of leadership failure became prominent.  Regime transition, 
democratization, democratic consolidation—all became topics of renewed interest.   
 
If, as specialists argued, states and the “rules of the game” can be shown to be 
important to economic and political development, and if issues such as corruption and 
leadership failure are critical constraints on development, and if the legitimate realm of 
state authority implies some necessary contract with civil society, then development 
requires active engagement in the practice of government and in the “contract” 
established between governors and governors.  Intervention—to create new institutions, 
to modify long-existing ones, to build systems that are immune to corruption, to bring 
citizen voice to decision making—takes theory and practice to the center of governments, 
where politics sets the themes and boundaries of what can occur.   
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created a significant dilemma for practitioners in international development agencies.  
Work to create, strengthen, or alter institutions and to acknowledge a role for civil society 
implied becoming more actively engaged in the inner workings of government.  Such 
activities meant doing much more than designing and advising on appropriate policies.  It 
meant encouraging action against corruption in public affairs, encouraging the 
development of organizations to monitor government actions and political activities, 
increasing the relevance of citizen voice in political decision making, speaking out 
against leadership failures, and other activities that made notions of purely technical 
advising and assistance difficult to sustain.  Could such international organizations be 
effectively engaged with the state and civil society in these ways without “being 
political?”  Their charters, after all, committed them to significant restraint in political 
matters. 
 
The concept of good governance proved an important fig leaf for resolving this 
dilemma.  It allowed international agencies to discuss and become more engaged in 
politics.  As suggested by Hewitt de Alcantara, governance was a hygienic way of 
dealing with political institutions and interactions—like corruption, accountability, and 
leadership—that came to be seen as impediments to development and to the effective use 
of development assistance.
26  The concept of good governance provided a “technical” 
approach to this delicate issue.  It was a concept that helped them escape “an intellectual 
and practical dead-end into which they had earlier been pushed by their extreme reliance 
on free-market ideals.”
27   
 
Certainly, the discussion of good governance captivated great interest among the 
international development organizations; they have all undertaken or supported research 
on the issue and they each have major publications that demonstrate the importance of the 
concept to development.  Between 2002 and 2007, for example, the World Bank loaned 
$22.7 billion for projects relat4ed to public sector governance and rule of law.
28  While 
some of this funding was no doubt re-labeling of programs and projects of long duration, 
new initiatives could be instituted under the rubric of good governance that might have 
seemed overly political in the past.     
 
Popularity: Providing a Capacious Umbrella.  The role of large-N studies of the 
sources of growth and development were also important in increasing the value and 
popularity of the concept of good governance among researchers and practitioners.  As 
the concept generated interest in the scholarly literature, researchers increasingly asked, 
“What is the relationship between good governance and development?”  Beginning in the 
1990s, and accelerating in the 2000s, researchers used sophisticated econometrics to 
measure and assess how various conditions of governance affected development.  They 
studied how corruption limited growth, how independent central banks contributed to 
macroeconomic stability, how property rights stimulated growth, and how parliamentary 
institutions were more conducive to political stability than presidential ones.  These 
studies pointed in a consistent direction—to significant relationships between good 
governance and important goals such as growth, poverty reduction, aid effectiveness, 
efficient bureaucracies, and higher foreign and private investment.
29   
  6 
Some studies utilized econometric analysis to address cause and effect 
relationships also.  Daniel Kaufman and other researchers, for example, demonstrated 
that the relationship between development and governance was more than correlational; 
good governance was shown to be a cause of development.
30  As concluded by the World 
Bank in a review of 40 studies, there was “overwhelming evidence that good governance 
is crucial for successful development, as measured by high per capita income.  Per capita 
income is a strong predictor of poverty rates, infant mortality and illiteracy, suggesting 
that good governance improves the well-being of the poor.”
31  Increasingly, then, the idea 
of good governance became a way not only to assess the role of the state in development 
and invade safely the minefield of domestic politics, it became a defining quality for 
development and a necessary condition for it.  The normative ingredients of the definition 
of good governance were shown empirically to be not only conducive to development but 
also necessary to it.
32   
 
In a similar way, the idea of good governance was useful as an umbrella concept 
to describe a wide variety of “good things.”  Thus, for example, the human rights 
community claimed, with considerable force and reason, that countries with good 
governance respected human rights.  Environmentalists argued that good governance 
meant effective stewardship of the environment and sustainability of development 
practices.  Empowerment of women, community management of forests, selective 
affirmative action, land use planning, legal aid for the poor, anti-corruption measures, and 
a variety of other conditions came to be associated with good governance.  Once a belief 
had been generated that good governance was essential to development—in fact, a 
precondition for it—then it was certainly advantageous for advocates to have their cause 
listed among the characteristics of good governance. 
 
Thus, the concept of good governance proved expansive enough to embrace many 
causes.  Each of these causes is no doubt good and worthy of support and commitment.  
Yet, by identifying good governance as a precondition to development, each of these 
good causes became transformed into a necessary component of initiatives to stimulate 
growth and political stability.  Getting developed became more and more onerous as 
increasing numbers of preconditions were tacked on to the agenda.  The danger is not the 
advocacy or the good things that various groups advocate.  The danger is overloading the 
development agenda, inflating what “must be done” beyond the capacities of most 
countries, and making good governance a precondition (rather than a result or ancillary 
process) for development to occur.   
 
Research, Practice, and Advocacy: Creating an Elastic Agenda.  Thus, the good 
governance agenda expanded.  Some years ago, I reviewed annual World Development 
Reports from 1997 (the year in which the WDR fully recognized the “rehabilitation” of 
the state as a positive contributor to development) to 2002 in an effort to understand how 
governance was being used in a publication that often sets the tone and agenda for much 
applied development thinking and action.  The results are instructive of the process of 
idea inflation.
33  From 45 different issues identified with the concept in 1997, by 2002, 
the WDR suggested 116 ways that developing countries needed to attend to 
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laws, institutions, and strategies for development.  The list of things that needed to be in 
place for good governance was on a roll.  
 
The Good Governance Agenda 
(Based on Items Referred to in World Development Reports) 
 1997  1998  1999/2000 2000/2001 2001/2002  2002/2003
Characteristics of 
good governance
1 
 
18 
 
17 
 
16 
 
19 
 
21 
 
25 
Institutions for 
good governance
2 
 
    8 
 
11 
 
10 
 
17 
 
21 
 
21 
Specific laws
3      4  14   6   9  16   9 
Specific policies
4    6  10  13 20 22 20 
Specific services
5    7  17  12 22 11 20 
Broad strategies 
for achieving 
specific goals
6 
 
 2 
 
9 
 
 9 
 
19 
 
 9 
 
21 
Total 45  78  66 106  100  116 
 
Examples of items listed: 
1 Good governance means: checks and balances in government, decentralization,    
  efficient/equitable/independent judiciary, free press, sound regulatory system, etc. 
2 Institutions for: bank and finance regulation, civil service, market efficiency, managing 
  decentralization, participation, transparent budgeting, etc. 
3 Laws for: trademark protection, enforcement of contracts, biodiversity, foreign  
   investment, labor standards, intellectual property rights, etc. 
4 Policies about: land reform, land policy, capital markets, community development,  
  downsizing bureaucracy, fisheries, insurance, social safety nets, etc. 
5 Services for: HIV/AIDS, communications, public transportation, safe water, legal 
  aid for the poor, micro-credit, targeted transfers, etc. 
6 Strategies for: asset creation for the poor, capacity building in the public sector,  
  empowering the poor, engaging the poor, environmental protection, knowledge  
  development, private sector development, etc. 
Source: Grindle 2004: 528 
 
Academic research, development practice, and advocacy have reached a strong 
consensus on the importance of good governance.  In academic research, we have 
statistical proof that good governance is critical to development.  In development 
practice, we have mountains of evidence of bad practice and weak institutions 
constraining the potential for development.  In advocacy, we have a multitude of 
organizations—international and domestic—demanding that “their” issues—whether it is 
the environment, human rights, fair trade, gender equity, or other “good”—be included in 
the development agenda.  Each of these sources makes good arguments about the 
centrality of good governance and shows logically why countries need it.  In each of 
these ways, the concept has become more essential to development.  At this point, 
however, some critical questions about the role of good governance in development are 
appropriate, challenging researchers, practitioners, and advocats to step back and assess 
its promise realistically and historically. 
   
Expecting Too Much by Explaining Too Much? 
  8   
Good ideas have a tendency to be credited with more importance in the 
development process than they may actually have.  They may even come to be treated as 
causal in development, thus setting an agenda specifying what countries must accomplish 
before they can develop that may not be reasonable or historically valid.  These dynamics 
contribute to long agendas and muddy thinking.  In the end, advocates of good 
governance who conflate good governance and development are suggesting that “the way 
to develop is to become developed.”
34  If we return to the research and practice related to 
good governance, we can see the ways in which conceptual inflation leads to muddy 
thinking, the evolution of possibly inappropriate models, and the practical implications of 
a long and elastic agenda.  
 
Muddy Thinking about Development.  Large-N cross-country analyses have most 
consistently shown that good governance is an essential ingredient in development; as we 
have seen, some research shows it as prior to and causal of development.  Such studies 
are undertaken in a search for regularities; for patterns that hold across countries and that 
illuminate the importance of particular variables in these patterns.  In governance 
research, for example, researchers can assess the “bang for the buck” that institutions 
such as secure property rights or an autonomous central bank contribute to economic 
growth across a variety of countries, or the role of competitive elections in political 
stability cross-nationally. 
 
Inevitably, because patterns are rarely universal—except at the most banal level—
some countries may exhibit good performance on the dependent variable—economic 
growth, say—but not score well on the independent variable—property rights, say, or low 
corruption—even while most countries conform to a predicted relationship.  
Characteristically, researchers disregard these outliers and focus on the explanatory value 
of the cases that fit the regression line.  Important insights and questions can be generated 
by looking at the outliers, however, not simply in terms of explaining why these 
particular cases are outliers but also in terms of raising some questions about the 
relationships being studied.
35    
 
For example, with any of a variety of reasonable measures of good governance, 
China and Vietnam are likely to score low.
36  Yet these countries have amassed 
extremely impressive records for consistently high growth rates and poverty reduction, in 
the case of China over the course of three decades.  They are also very large countries—
China the largest in the world—whose performance probably ought not to be overlooked 
in terms of what it suggests about the importance of good governance. If this and other 
countries can develop in significant ways without at the same time demonstrating clear 
good governance, shouldn’t researchers consider such cases as important to a theoretical 
relationship between governance and development?  
 
A similar kind of caution comes with a consideration of Bangladesh, a country 
sometimes credited with having virtually no government at all and which ranks among 
the lowest 14 countries on a standard governance index, the Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index, which has recently chalked up several consecutive years of 
  9growth rates in excess of five percent a year, a longer and higher history of growth than at 
any other time since the country gained independence.
37  Peru, Panama, Tanzania, 
Algeria, and India might also emerge as outliers whose performance is unexpected, given 
a hypothesized relationship between various dimensions of governance and growth. 
Advanced industrial countries often grew significantly before they had anything 
approaching good governance.
38  
 
The relationship between democracy and good governance is also complex in 
practice.  Many Latin American countries have democratic institutions yet show high 
rates of corruption, low levels of transparency, and other dimensions of bad governance.  
Some East Asian countries have demonstrated that it is possible to have relatively good 
governance with very little democracy.   
 
Neither is good governance consistently associated with good public performance.  
By most measures of governance, for example, the United States scores high.  Its 
macroeconomy is relatively well managed, government action is for the most part fairly 
transparent, and its government is accountable to its citizens.  Yet, the response to 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 was not only a profound failure of leadership at local, state, 
and national levels, it was also clearly a massive failure of governance.  The systems put 
in place to protect citizens didn’t work; the institutions that were supposed to allocate 
authority and responsibility among different levels of authority in government didn’t 
function; and the organizations set up to deal with emergencies were simply not up to the 
task.  The fact that these systems, institutions, and organizations failed the poor, racial 
minorities, and the marginalized simply underscores the failure of governance in a 
political system reputed to have met the challenge of good governance.  In contrast, in 
terms of being able to cope with unanticipated demands on it, the Pakistani government 
responded quickly and relatively effectively to the massive earthquake, also in 2005, 
despite overall low rankings in terms of governance.  These outliers suggest that when 
researchers conflate good governance with the capacity to grow or the existence of 
democracy, they are probably oversimplifying very complex relationships.   
 
Here, my point is not that the econometrics were mistaken, that the formulas were 
mis-specified, or that the concepts were poorly operationalized and measured (although 
this might be the case).  I am rather suggesting that the outliers can force us to ask, “Just 
how important is the relationship?”  Or, “Under what conditions does this relationship 
hold and when does it not?”  If a country like China can grow consistently for three 
decades with demonstrably poor governance—and certainly nothing like political 
democracy—it seems useful to assess whether the relationship between growth and good 
governance is as consistent as is often stated.  When the United States can exhibit a 
massive failure of governance, it suggests that the idea may be more slippery than 
imagined.  Where outliers are large, important countries, more attention rather than less 
should be paid to what their experience has to say about the overall pattern discovered in 
the research.  In a critique of the literature linking growth and governance, Kurtz and 
Schrank indicate the consequences of muddy thinking by concluding that “the oft-
asserted connection between growth and governance lies on exceedingly shaky empirical 
pilings.”
39 
  10 
Models and their Replication.  As a result of research and practice indicating that 
good governance is critical to development, institutional blueprints for its achievement 
have become common.  There are, then, models and “best practices” for a good 
parliamentary democracy and effective checks and balances systems.  There are 
blueprints for how to regulate environmental hazards and stock and bond markets; there 
are blueprints for judicial institutions, tax agencies, and federalism.  The list could go on.   
 
If the structure and function of institutions are closely tied to the context within 
which they emerged and developed, however, the search for institutional blueprints and 
practices can be misleading.  This is the view of a number of researchers who have used 
in-depth analyses of particular countries or regions to argue that distinct development 
paths can be credited to unique experiences, particular international contexts, the 
historical development of relationships between economic and political elites or between 
elites and masses, or other specific experiences.  These researchers would argue that 
broad generalizations about governance overlook how country and regional destinies are 
shaped by specific international, institutional, policy, and even leadership experiences.
40  
If this is the case—as the body of literature focusing on path dependence suggests—then 
institutions may not be easily or successfully transferred from one context to another.      
 
Blueprints and models may also be based on questionable assumptions.  For 
example, in looking closely at the often recommended “Nordic model” of governance, 
Matt Andrews points out that Sweden, Denmark, and Norway’s governments are 
organized in distinct ways and involve a series of distinct rules of the game and 
institutional relationships.
41  In this case, it would be appropriate to ask which model of 
governance is actually implied in this Nordic case. 
 
Similarly, blueprints and best practices overlook the possibility that whether 
institutions function as anticipated may be subject to timing and context.  A good 
example of this is the development of an independent central bank in Russia after the fall 
of the Soviet Union.  Few economists would argue with the notion that an independent 
central bank is important to macroeconomic stability and good governance of the 
economy, yet in Russia, independence was ceded at a time that the central bank was 
dominated by an old guard of party apparatchiks who were not particularly interested in 
modeling the activities of the bank in the way that economic reformers thought 
necessary.
42  It is likely that many a president or minister of finance of a country 
undergoing a severe economic crisis wishes for less independence of the central bank in 
order to respond more effectively and rapidly to the crisis.  The overall generalization of 
the importance of independence to good economic management is important, but it is not 
necessarily universal or unrelated to specific historical conditions. 
 
A similar distinction can be made in terms of historical sequences of activities.  
Some researchers, for example, have compared the evolution of civil service systems that 
were professionalized before the introduction of democracy with those that were 
introduced in the context of competitive party politics.  In the first case, elite civil 
services were rapidly put in place; in the latter cases, positions in government were long a 
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and reformers, who wanted a professionalized civil service.  The introduction and 
evolution of systems can be quite different, depending on their relationship to other major 
historical transformations. 
 
The Practical Burden of a Long Agenda.  The good governance agenda 
expanded during the decade of the 1990s.  Thus, by the early 2000s, it was possible to 
claim that: 
   
Getting good governance calls for improvements that touch virtually all 
aspects of the public sector—from institutions that set the rules of the 
game for economic and political interaction, to decision-making structures 
that determine priorities among public problems and allocate resources to 
respond to them, to organizations that manage administrative systems and 
deliver goods and services to citizens, to human resources that staff 
government bureaucracies, to the interface of officials and citizens in 
political and bureaucratic arenas…Not surprisingly, advocating good 
governance raises a host of questions about what needs to be done, when it 
needs to be done, and how it needs to be done.
43 
 
The problem, of course, is the challenge of fixing a large number of governance 
deficits, particularly in countries with fragile, weak, or failed states.  Any tourist visiting 
a developing country, let alone an expert in organizational management, legal systems, 
economic development, infrastructure, or other field, can find plenty of evidence of much 
that doesn’t work well.  The deficits in how government works—from the behavior of 
immigration and customs officials in the airport to the pot-holed roads in the capital city 
to the apparent poverty of citizens, to the paucity of public services, to the lack of 
infrastructure in rural areas—are usually more than evident.  Clearly, much needs to be 
“fixed.”  But this observation does not go far in suggesting how to go about fixing 
whatever it is that is in deficit.  With so much to do, what determines priorities?  With so 
many demands of things that need to be fixed, where should scarce financial, human, and 
organizational resources be focused?   
 
More important, much is unknown about the timing and sequences involved in 
“getting fixed.”  For example, the good governance agenda grew with little attention the 
historical experience of countries deemed to have good governance—they didn’t always 
have this, so how did they get better?  Priorities, sequences, timing—are all institutions 
equally important? Are they independent of each other as they develop? How long does it 
take to develop good governance?  Even without good responses to these questions, 
however, the practical work of “fixing” bad governance has proceeded apace, far 
outstripping knowledge about how institutions of governance develop over time and the 
consequences of governance innovations.  Within a short period, developing country 
governments have become laboratories for any number of efforts to generate good 
governance; many have been overwhelmed by the attention.   
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bilateral and multilateral development assistance organizations, found that these 
organizations provided assistance to an average of 107 countries each; recipient countries 
were dealing with an average of 26 donors apiece; 40 countries were dealing with 30 or 
more donors.
44  Further, they discovered that in 80 percent of individual fund transfers 
between donors and recipients, less than 1 percent of the donor’s total aid budget was at 
stake.  They cite Vietnam as a fairly typical example.  “In 2002, 25 official bilateral 
donors, 19 official multilateral donors, and about 350 international NGOs were operating 
in Vietnam. They collectively accounted for over 8,000 projects, or about one project per 
9,000 people.”
45  Presumably, each project and each transfer of funds implies a series of 
transaction costs in communications, accounting, paperwork, and other investments of 
time and energy.  While much development assistance is being directed to programs other 
than governance, the figures themselves suggest the burden on developing country 
governments that are dealing with a multitude of donors and a long and lengthening 
agenda.  This is a concept grown too large to be reasonable. 
 
Weak formal institutions of governance are emblematic of—at times conceptually 
inseparable from—poor and developing countries.  The poorer, the likelier they are to 
have weak or non-existent institutions for making public decisions, allocating resources, 
and protecting citizens.  Thus, a critical problem of the good governance agenda in 
practice is the burdens its length places on countries that are in the worst position to 
respond to them.  The elites who dominate such governments are not always interested in 
improving governance, as this could easily limit their power and access to rents and 
resources.  Even with well-meaning governments convinced of the need to improve 
governance, the question of where to focus resources and what to do is elusive.  The 
agenda specifies an end goal—good performance defined in various ways as indicated 
above—but does not indicate how to get there.  Should all governance deficits be tackled 
at once?  If not, which ones are most important?  Which ones are logically prior to 
others?  
 
This is particularly true when good governance is considered to be a condition 
necessary for development to take place.  In this line of reasoning, a very great deal needs 
to be accomplished—with an unspecified timeline—before a country can rest assured that 
its economy will grow and that its citizens will be treated fairly.  Commitment to the 
good governance agenda as a condition necessary for development means resources and 
public energies focused on achieving this very difficult goal and we may well ask 
whether the resources and energy might better be focused on other aspects of 
development.  The argument is not that good governance isn’t important, but rather that it 
might not be essential or necessary for growth and poverty alleviation or democracy.  
Good governance, in fact, may even be a consequence of development, as Ha Joon Chang 
has argued.
46  Again, the example of China in the past 30 years is instructive.  In all 
likelihood, most Chinese citizens would benefit from better governance—but it is clear 
that the growth of the economy or foreign investment or poverty reduction have not been 
contingent upon this advancement. 
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have claimed that much development assistance undercuts the governance capacities of 
developing countries—the agenda is imposed, the number of reforms thought necessary 
is overwhelming, the time and attention of public officials is fractured among a host of 
donor activities, and foreign experts take on the task of administering policies, programs, 
and projects.
47  Development assistance agencies have to some degree acknowledged this 
critique by placing more emphasis on ownership and participation by developing country 
governments and citizens.  Nevertheless, in the way these activities work out in practice, 
the influence of development assistance agencies often remains overwhelming and 
ownership and participation can be window dressing for changes initiated and pursued by 
others.  
 
As an antidote to the inflation of the governance agenda, several years ago I 
suggested the idea of “good enough governance” as a way of questioning the length of 
the agenda and its essentialist message.
48  I indicated that good enough governance 
means that,  
 
…not all governance deficits need to be (or can be) tackled at once and that 
institution and capacity building are products of time; governance achievements 
can also be reversed.  Good enough governance means that interventions thought 
to contribute to the ends of economic and political development need to be 
questioned, prioritized, and made relevant to the conditions of individual 
countries.  They need to be assessed in light of historical evidence, sequence, and 
timing, and they should be selected carefully in terms of their contributions to 
particular ends such as poverty reduction and democracy.  Good enough 
governance directs attention to considerations of the minimal conditions of 
governance necessary to allow political and economic development to occur.
49 
  
Skepticism as an Antidote to Idea Inflation? 
 
There is an intimate linkage between theory and practice in development.  
Throughout the post-WWII history of the social sciences, theories have been adopted and 
put in practice by development practitioners, including governments in developing 
countries, and practice has fed back into renewed interest in generating theory to advance 
development and to take account of the failures of previous applications of theory to 
practice.  Researchers and practitioners will recognize a more general trajectory of 
parallelism and interaction between what is being discussed by scholars and what is being 
done in the real world by practitioners.  Ideas matter. 
 
Indeed, the role of ideas in the “real world”—and the observation of practice that 
then generates insights that are adopted in new ideas—is perhaps more dynamic and 
important in countries struggling with the challenges of development than in already 
developed countries.  In such countries, formal institutions of economic and political 
governance tend to be less embedded, more fluid and changeable, than they are in already 
developed countries, so the application and adoption of new ideas, of new ways of doing 
things, at least at the formal institutional level, face fewer barriers.  Moreover, many 
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instability of various kinds; economic and political crises often open up opportunities for 
innovation in ways that is much more difficult under business- and politics-as-usual 
conditions.  In important ways, then, developing countries provide laboratories for a 
succession of new ideas.   
  
This is a good reason to be careful of attractive ideas, particularly those that 
promise a great deal.  Skepticism may be particularly useful in such contexts to keep 
development agendas—like good governance—from become unnecessarily inflated.  
Indeed, it is useful to keep a few adages in mind in containing idea expansion: 
 
►Development—whether economic or political—is a long term and complex 
process; research is far from understanding the timing and the complexity of 
“getting developed.” 
 
►Explorations of historical experience can do much to illuminate issues of 
timing and complexity. 
 
►When concepts like governance take on strong normative content (good 
governance), their importance and impact are attractive to researchers, 
practitioners, and advocates, who in turn may add to the inflation of the concept.     
 
Indeed, the history of the concept of good governance suggests that skepticism is a good 
intellectual tool for shedding light on why development is such a difficult process and 
why it is often so elusive.  Good governance is important; it is a condition that we can 
hope all the world’s people can enjoy.  At the same time, there is much to be understood 
about the concept and about how it is achieved in practice.  Good governance is 
important; but like many other good ideas, it is not a magic bullet. 
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